Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1
Tort; Negligence; the duty of care; foreseeability of harm; liability of statutory authorities for omissions.
Facts: In the 1960s, Crimmins was employed as a waterside worker on the docks in Melbourne. Crimmins's employer did not supply safety equipment. While unloading ships Crimmins was exposed to asbestos dust and as a result contracted a fatal lung disease. Crimmins's executrix alleged that the Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (SIFC), the statutory authority in charge of the docks, had owed Crimmins a duty of care in relation to this foreseeable harm.
Issue: Did the SIFC owe a duty of care to Crimmins?
Decision: The High Court found that the SIFC owed a duty of care to Crimmins.
Reason: The judges adopted different approaches, but they commonly rejected the use of public law notions to determine the common law liability of a statutory authority. There was also an emphasis on Crimmins' vulnerability in relation to the statutory authority which had both knowledge of the particular risk and the power to protect the workers.
Gaudron J said (at [46]):
"Given the vulnerability of the late Mr Crimmins, the knowledge the Authority had or should have had, and its position to control or minimise the risks associated with the handling of asbestos, there was, in my view, a relationship between Crimmins and the Authority giving rise to a duty of care on the part of the Authority..."
McHugh J put forward a series of questions to help decide whether a duty of care exists.
"1. Was it reasonably foreseeable that an act or omission of the defendant, including a failure to exercise its statutory powers, would result in injury to the plaintiff or his or her interests? If no, then there is no duty.
2. By reason of the defendant's statutory or assumed obligations or control, did the defendant have the power to protect a specific class including the plaintiff (rather than the public at large) from a risk of harm? If no, then there is no duty.
3. Was the plaintiff or were the plaintiff 's interests vulnerable in the sense that the plaintiff could not reasonably be expected to adequately safeguard himself or herself or those interests from harm? If no, then there is no duty.
4. Did the defendant know, or ought the defendant to have known, of the risk of harm to the specific class including the plaintiff if it did not exercise its powers? If no, then there is no duty.
5. Would such a duty impose liability with respect to the defendant's exercise of 'core policy making' or 'quasi-legislative' functions? If yes, then there is no duty.
6. Are there any other supervening reasons in policy to deny the existence of a duty of care (eg, the imposition of a duty is inconsistent with the statutory scheme, or the case is concerned with pure economic loss and the application of principles in that field deny the existence of a duty)? If yes, then there is no duty."